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I. INTRODUCTION 
Compared to agrarian society, which has predominated most of historical 
times, our growth-oriented industrial society is presumed to be socially mobile 
and egalitarian. The recent availability of longitudinal data makes the 
measurement of such a central concept as mobility increasingly possible. In the 
words of the authors of a recent survey, the problem is that, compared with the 
neighboring area of inequality measurement, lithe income mobility literature is 
still distressingly far from being unified on how to measure mobility and make 
mobility comparisons", Fields and Ok (2000, p. 586) -or Fa for short, from here 
on. 
Among the many issues that remain open, the main question we address 
in this paper is the distinction between structural and exchange mobility (1). Since 
we want to study under what conditions structural, exchange and total mobility 
are socially desirable, we shall concentrate on ethical or normative mobility 
indexes which are capable of addressing this issue. 
Ethical indices are derived from explicit social evaluation functions (SEF, 
for short). In a static context, the SEF is simply defined on the space of one-period 
income distributions. In the present dynamic context, what the SEF domain 
should be is not an obvious question. Given a decision in this regard, it is 
important to know whether in order to construct meaningful mobility measures 
we need SEFs which incorporate new value judgments beyond the traditional 
ones. 
In their seminal contributions in this area, both Markandya (1982, 1984) 
and King (1983) restrict themselves to a two-period world and introduce novel 
SEFs which lead to new value judgements. In an intergenerational context with 
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two generations, Markandya (1982, 1984) identifies the social welfare with the 
welfare of the current generation. In turn, the welfare of the current generation is 
represented by a utilitarian SEF where the utility of any individual in this 
generation depends not only on his/ her lifetime income, but also on the lifetime 
income of his / her parent. The link between income mobility and social welfare 
requires new value judgements on the nature and the strength of the inter-
generational links in such a utility function. On the other hand, King (1983) 
proposes a two-period model where the SEF is defined on individual incomes 
during the second period and rank reversals between the two periods. Therefore, 
new value judgements about the welfare effects of rank reversals are required. 
In this paper, we follow the ethical approach originally suggested in 
Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985), or CDW for short. They compare the 
actual time path of incomes received over a number of periods with a 
hypothetical benchmark which maintains constant over time the relative or 
absolute positions occupied by the individuals in the actual first-period income 
distribution. CDW also restrict themselves to a two-period model but, contrary to 
Markandya (1982, 1984) and King (1983)'s, their SEF is defined on aggregate 
incomes over the two periods and does not include any new value judgment 
beyond the traditional ones. 
In this framework, we find it essential to distinguish between two types of 
rank reversals ignored in CDW: rank reversals between the first- and second-
period income distributions, which we call permutations; and rank reversals 
between the first-period and the aggregate income distributions, which we call 
rerankings. The distinction can be illustrated by means of a pair of simple 
examples for an economy with two individuals. In both examples the first period 
income distribution is (2, 4). In example 1, the second period income distribution 
is (4, 3). Therefore, there is a permutation; but since the aggregate income 
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distribution is (6, 7), there is no reranking. In example 2, the second period 
income distribution is (7, 0), representing the same total income growth as before. 
The aggregate income distribution is now (9, 4), so there is both a permutation 
and a reranking. 
Using this distinction, we offer two novel decompositions of CDW's 
mobility index. In the more basic decomposition, we express our income mobility 
index as the sum of two terms: the first one, which we call structural or snapshot 
mobility, captures the welfare effect of the change in income inequality between 
the aggregate and the completely immobile distribution, once all permutations 
have been eliminated. The second term, which we call exchange or permutations 
nlObilihj, measures the welfare impact of permutations between the first- and the 
second-period income distributions, with or without rerankings between the 
initial and the aggregate income distributions. 
We do not impose any value judgments either on permutations or 
rerankings. However, in the presence of permutations, we show that exchange 
mobility is always socially desirable. On the other hand, in the presence of 
rerankings, we show that there exists a second-period income distribution with 
less inequality which implies the same rate of income growth, the same income 
mobility, but no rerankings at alL 
According to FO, "While most people feel that the notions of income 
inequality and income growth are largely independent concepts, it seems 
reasonable to view the movement aspect of mobility as closely related with 
income growth ."(p. 563, emphasis in the original). Following up on this idea, we 
present a second decomposition of the CDW income mobility index into three 
terms. To begin with, we express our index as the sum of two terms: an income 
transfer mobility index, which captures the income mobility induced by changes in 
snapshot income inequality and permutations, holding the mean of the second-
3 
period income distribution constant at the level of the first-period one; and an 
income growth mobility index, which is a residual capturing the income mobility 
induced by the differences in the mean of the two period income distributions. In 
a second step, the income transfer mobility index is decomposed into its 
structural and exchange mobility components. The paper explores the relation 
between the two decompositions. 
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. In section 11 we present 
the assumptions of the CDW model. Sections III and IV are devoted to the 
decomposition of the income mobility into structural and exchange mobility, and 
income transfer and income growth mobility, respectively. Section V compares 
our decompositions with the ideas put forth in the previous literature, while 
Section VI concludes. 
11. THE MODEL 
Among the approaches developed by economists for the study of 
economic and social mobility, it is useful to distinguish between two types. The 
first one considers explicitly the transition mechanism responsible for the time 
path of the variable of interest. Together with income, this variable may be any 
real-valued measure of socioeconomic position, like indexes of social or 
occupational status. The transition mechanism is often represented by a 
transition matrix which shows the fraction of the population which moves from 
one category to another in one time period. In this context, an index of mobility is 
defined as a real function on the set of transition matrices(2). 
The second approach, which we follow in this paper, is meant for a less 
abstract setting in which the variable of interest is income. Abstracting from the 
transition mechanism, we are simply concerned in a straightforward way with 
4 
the changes that can be observed in longitudinal data sets: changes in cross-
section or snapshot income inequality, changes in relative incomes or in absolute 
income differences, and changes in mean incomes. In this context, an index of 
mobility is defined as a real-valued function on the set of time paths of income 
distributions. Indices of relative or absolute mobility are sensitive to changes in 
relative incomes or in income differences, respectively(3). 
Let there be n ~ 2 individuals, indexed by i = I, ... , n, and let D = R~+ be 
the strictly positive orthant in n-dimensional Euclidean space. In a two period 
world, let x = (x\ ... , xn)ED represent the income distribution of an n-person 
society where individual i's income level is xi. Now assume that individual i's 
income has changed to yl in a given time interval. Following FO's terminology, 
we say that x has been transformed to y = (y\ ... , yn)ED, and denote this so-called 
distributional transformation by x -+ y. Each individual i is characterized by an 
income stream (xi, yi). Over the two periods, individual i receives aggregate 
income zia = xi + yi. We refer to the distribution za = (z\, ... , zn a) as the aggregate 
income distribution(4). 
As pointed out by FO, while it admittedly confines the analysis to only 2-
period paths of income distributions, this framework allows one to study both 
intra and intergenerational mobility measurement, depending on the length of 
the time period between the observation periods. In the intergenerational case, 
we may start by assuming that every parent has only one child. Then, xi and yi 
can be interpreted as the parent and the child incomes, respectively, and zi a as 
the dynastic or family income. In the intragenerational case, xi and yi can be 
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taken to be individual i's income while "young" and "old", respectively, and zia 
his/ her lifetime income. On the other hand, recall that the papers in the relevant 
literature, namely, King (1983) and Markandya (1982, 1984), also assume a two 
period world. 
The ethical approach to measuring income mobility in CDW uses an 
intertemporal social evaluation function (SEF for short), v: D2 - RI, where v(x, y) 
is the social welfare level associated with the distributional transformation x -
y(5). The income mobility concept we wish to explore is the one embodied in a 
welfare comparison of the actual distributional transformation x - y, and a 
hypothetical benchmark x - Yb: the distributional transformation which would 
have resulted in the absence of mobility given the first period distribution x. That 
is to say, mobility indices are obtained by comparing the actual level of social 
welfare v(x, y) with the level of social welfare v(x, Yb) which would have been 
obtained with the benchmark distributional transformation x - y b' 
To make this comparison operational, CDW make the following two 
fundamental assumptions referring to the notion of complete immobility in the 
relative case and the nature of the SEF, respectively. 
A. 1. Let !l(x) be the mean of any income distribution xED. We say that 
the distributional transformation x - y exhibits complete relative immobility if 
individual income shares are maintained through time equal to the income 
shares in the first period distribution x, i.e., if y = Y b' where Yb = (!l(Y) / !l(x))x, so 
that !l(Yb) = !l(Y), and I(Yb) = I(x) for any index of relative income inequality I. 
Consequently, the aggregate distribution for this benchmark transformation, 
denoted by zb' has the same mean as za' but gives each individual the same share 
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of actual aggregate income as they receive in period 1, that is, ~(zb) = ~(za) and 
I(zb) = I(x)(6). 
The second assumption requires that the only features of the 
distributional transformations x ~ y and x ~ Yb relevant for the welfare 
comparisons are their aggregate distributions za and zb. Formally: 
A. 2. There exists a SEF W: D ~ Rl such that, for all distributional 
transformations x ~ y, W(za) = vex, y). 
An income mobility index assigns a mobility value to each distributional 
transformation x ~ y, i.e. it is a function M: D2 ~ Rl. CDW suggest the following 
index of income mobility in the relative case: 
(1) 
An immobile income structure is assigned a mobility value of zero(7). Both 
periods are then reflected in the construction of the mobility indices, the first-
period distribution through its effect on the aggregate benchmark distribution zb' 
and the second-period distribution through its effect on the actual aggregate 
distribution za" 
The next assumption, which is also taken from CDW, refers to the 
welfare evaluation of one-period income distributions. 
A. 3. There exists a SEF defined on one-period incomes, W*: D ~ Rl, and 
this function is the same as the two-period SEF W, i.e. W*(x) = W(x) and W*(y) = 
W(y). 
The identification of one-period evaluations with two-period ones is 
questionable, but it greatly simplifies our work(8). The remaining properties of 
the income mobility index depend on additional assumptions on the SEF. For our 
analytical purposes, we only need that W can be expressed in terms of only two 
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statistics of the income distribution, the mean and an index of income inequality. 
However, for operational purposes it is convenient to specify the trade-off 
between efficiency and distributional considerations. Consequently, in the 
relative case we adopt the following assumption: 
A. 4. For any income distribution xED, the SEF W can be expressed as: 
W(x) = ~(x)(l - I(x)). 
Thus, social welfare is seen to be the product of the mean and an adjustment 
factor which varies inversely with an appropriate index of relative inequality 1(9). 
In this case, the CDW income mobility index defined in (1) becomes 
M(x, y) = {I(x) - I(za)} / (1 - I(x)} (l0). (2) 
In our view, using FO's terminology, the CBW income mobility index defined in 
equation (2) measures mobility as movement. However, contrary to descriptive 
income mobility indices, this ethical index allows us to determine whether the 
observed income movement is socially desirable. Consider the following two 
examples: 
El: x = (2,4) -+ Y = (4, 3); za = (6, 7) 
E2: x = (2,4) -+ Y = (2, 5); za = (4, 9). 
The initial situation is the same in both examples, x = (2, 4). Since ~(Y) = 7/2, the 
rate of income growth is also the same in El and E2. However, it is clear that 
M(El) ={1(2, 4) - 1(6, 7)} / {1 - 1(2, 4)} > 0, while M(E2) ={1(2, 4) - 1(4, 9)} / {1 - 1(2, 4)} 
< o. The reduction in income inequality in za relative to x causes M(El) to be 
positive, reflecting an increase in social welfare. The opposite situation causes 
M(E2) to be negative, reflecting a social welfare loss. 
Finally, in FO's terminology the CDW index defined in equation (2) is 
weakly relative, i.e. for any income transformation x -+ y, M(Ax, Ay) = M(x, y) for 
all J.. > O. The reason, of course, is that in the distributional transformation Ax -+ 
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Ay the aggregate income distribution is AZa, where za = x + y, and I(Aza) = 
l(za)(1l)· 
Ill. STRUCTURAL AND EXCHANGE MOBILITY 
Ill. 1. Definitions 
Apparently, our income mobility index reflects welfare changes due 
solely to changes in income inequality from the initial to the final situation. One 
of the points of this paper is to clarify why this is not the case at all. Upon closer 
inspection, income changes in example El presented in the previous Section give 
rise to two effects: a change in cross-section or snapshot income inequality from 
1(1,3) to 1(4, 3); and a permutation of the ordering of individual incomes between 
the first- and the second-period income distributions -in distribution x individual 
1 is poorer than 2, while in distribution y individual 1 is richer. 
At this point, it is useful to consider a third example: 
E3: x = (2, 4) ~ y = (5, 2); za = (7, 6). 
Both the initial situation and the rate of income growth coincide with those of 
examples El and E2. Given the symmetry of I, we have that 1(6, 7) = 1(7, 6). 
Therefore, we have that M(E3) = M(E1). The (important) novelty in relation to El, 
is that in E3 there is both a permutation between the two snapshot distributions x 
and y, and what we call a reranking between the first-period and the aggregate 
income distributions, x and za' respectively. 
Examples El and E3 suggest that our mobility index can be decomposed 
into two terms. One capturing the welfare change due to the change in inequality 
between the cross-section distributions x and y once all permutations have been 
removed, and a second one capturing the permutation effect with or without 
re ranking between x and za. Therefore, from a formal point of view what we 
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wish to achieve is a decomposition of the mobility index M(x, y) into a structural 
or snapshot mobility index, SM(x, y), and an exchange or permutations mobility 
component, EM(x, y). 
For that purpose, it is important to retain the following terminology. 
Given a distributional transformation x - y, we will always consider that x is 
ordered according to the "less than or equal" relation. Whenever x and y are not 
equally ordered, we say that there has been some permutation between them; 
whenever x and za = x + y are not equally ordered, we say that there has been 
some reranking between them. Of course, any reranking between x and za implies 
some permutation between x and y (as in E3), but not the contrary (as in El). 
Finally, given any distributional transformation x - y, define Zc = x + y', where 
y' is the second-period distribution y ordered as the initial distribution x. 
Armed with these concepts, we suggest the following decomposition of 
our mobility index: 
M(x, y) = SM(x, y) + EM(x, y), 
where 
SM(x, y) = {W(zc) - W(zb)}/W(zb) = {I(x) - I(zc)}/ {l- I(x)} (5) 
EM(x, y) = {W(za) - W(zc)}/W(zb) = {I(zc) - I(za)}/ {l- I(x)}. (6) 
We can view SM(x, y) as the income mobility associated with the distributional 
transformation x - y' in which all the permutations between x and y have been 
eliminated, i. e. SM(x, y) = M(x, y'). Then, exchange mobility is defined as a 
residual, i. e. EM(x, y) = M(x, y) - M(x, y') (12). 
Ill. 2. Properties 
Remark 1. Since I(y') = I(y) and I(zc)E{Min(I(x), I(y»), Max(I(x), I(y»)}, we 
have that 
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SM(x, y) ~ 0 <=> I(x) ~ I(y). 
< < 
(7) 
That is, the structural mobility index captures the welfare change due to the 
change in cross-section or snapshot inequality. 
Consider the case in which there is no permutation between x and y, so 
that y' = y, and Zc = za. As pointed out in Fa, in King's (1983) model there is no 
mobility. In our case, all mobility is structural mobility which, by (7), in general is 
different from zero. 
In the presence of some permutation between x and y, we can show that 
exchange mobility is always socially desirable. 
Theorem 1. Let x - y be a distributional transformation such that y' ;.0 Y 
and zc;.o za' i.e. such that there is some permutation between x and y. Then, 
EM(x, y) > o. 
(See the proof in the Appendix). 
If I(x) ~ I(y), then by (7) structural mobility is non-negative. Hence total 
mobility M(x, y) will be positive. An example of this situation is provided by El, 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 around here 
When I(x) < I(y), the sign of M(x, y) depends on the relative strength of EM(x, y) 
and M(x, y). Consider the following example illustrated in Figure 2: 
E4: x = (2,4) - Y = (7, 0); za = (9, 4). 
There is a reranking between x and za and, therefore, a permutation between x 
and y which causes EM(x, y) > o. On the other hand, since I(x) < I(y) we have that 
SM(x, y) < O. It turns out that the SM(x, y) is stronger than EM(x, y), so that M(x, 
y) < O. 
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Figure 2 around here 
In the presence of rerankings, we can show that there exists some 
reallocation of the second-period total income which gives rise to the same 
mobility but with no reranking at all. The elimination of rerankings does away 
with some or all permutations, causing exchange mobility to decrease or to 
disappear altogether. Total mobility remains constant because the new second-
period income distribution has less inequality than the original one; a change 
that implies an increase in structural mobility which exactly offsets the reduction 
in exchange mobility. Formally, we have: 
Theorem 2. Let x ~ y be a distributional transformation so that there is 
some reranking between x and za' Then, there exists some y*ED with the 
following properties: (i) !l(Y*) = !l(y); (ii) M(x, y*) = M(x, y); (iii) There is no 
reranking between x and za * = X + y*; (iv) I(y*) < I(y). 
(See the proof in the Appendix). 
If we are interested at all in the social welfare during the second period, 
then Theorem 2 ensures that, in the presence of rerankings, we can always 
increase the original second period welfare maintaining overall mobility 
constant. On the other hand, given a distributional transformation x ~ y with 
some rerankings between x and za' Theorem 2 allows us to disentangle the part 
of exchange mobility EM(x, y) which is due solely to the rerankings and the part 
which is due to any remaining permutations between x and y. 
Consider the income transformation x ~ y* where y* is the second-
period income distribution found in Theorem 2. There are two cases. In the first 
case, there are no permutations between x and y*, so that all income mobility 
M(x, y*) is structural mobility and the entire exchange mobility EM(x, y) can be 
attributed to the permutations induced by the original rerankings between x and 
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Za. In the second case, after the removal of all rerankings between x and za there 
are still some permutations left between x and y*. In this case, 
where 
M(x, y*) = SM(x, y*) + EM(x, y*), 
SM(x, y*) = {I(x) - I(z* c)} / {l - I(x)}, 
EM(x, y) = {I(z* c) - I(z* a)} / {1 - I(x)}, 
Za * = X + y*, Zc * = X + y*', and y*' is the income distribution y* ordered as x. On 
the other hand, 
where 
M(x, y) = SM(x, y) + EM(x, y), 
SM(x, y) = (I(x) - I(zc)} / {I - I(x)}, 
EM(x, y) = {I(zc) - I(za)} / {l - I(x)}, 
Za = X + y, Zc = x + y', and y' is the income distribution y ordered as x. By 
Theorem 2.iv, I(y*') = I(y*) < I(y) = I(y'). Therefore, we must have that I(z* c) < 
I(zc)' so that SM(x, y*) > SM(x, y). By Theorem 2.ii, we have that M(x, y*) = M(x, 
y). Consequently, EM(x, y) > EM(x, y*), and the expression EM(x, y) - EM(x, y*) is 
a good measure of the income mobility due solely to the permutations between x 
and y induced by the rerankings between x and za. 
The final question in this Section refers to what happens when, given a 
distributional transformation x - y, we switch the roles of x and y and consider 
the distributional transformation y - x. It is clear that our income mobility index 
is sensitive to the choice of the base period. In our two period world this is not 
important because the choice of base period is naturally given to us both in the 
intergenerational and the intragenerational interpretations: the income 
distribution of the parent generation and the lIyoung", respectively. 
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Nevertheless, it is interesting to know the consequences of the base period 
reversal. It turns out that the result depends on the relationship between I(x) and 
I(y). Formally, we have: 
Remark 2. Let x -+ y be a distributional transformation with za = x + y. 
Assume, without loss of generality, that there is some permutation between x 
and y, and let Zc = x + y', where y' is income distribution y ordered as x. Define a 
distributional transformation y -+ x, where y is ordered according to the "less 
than or equal" relation. Let za* = y + x. Notice that za* = za' so that I(za*) = I(za)' 
Let Zc * = y + x', where x' is income distribution x ordered as y. Since Zc * = zc' we 
have that: 
SM(x, y) = {I(x) -I(zc)} / {l - I(x)} ~ SM(y, x) = {I(y) - I(zc)} / {l - I(y)} <=> I(x)} ~ I(y) 
and 
EM(x, y) = {I(zc) - I(za)}/ {l- I(x)} ~ EM(y, x) = {I(zc) - I(za)}/ {l- I(y)} <=> I(x)} ~ I(y). 
Hence, 
M(x, y) ~ M(y, x) <=> I(x)} ~ I(y). 
IV. THE ROLE OF INCOME GROWTH 
As we saw in Section 11, the income mobility index defined in equation 
(2) measures mobility as movement. Since it is a weakly relative index, a 
distributional transformation x -+ y which involves only a change in scale, with 
y = Ax for some A> 0, causes no mobility, i. e., M(x, AX) = O. Therefore, M(x, y) ;o! 0 
implies that either I(x) ;o! I(y) or that there are some permutations between x and 
y. In this case, we can take into account FO's observation that it is reasonable to 
view the movement aspect of mobility as closely related to -positive or negative-
income growth, i. e., to differences between !-l(y) and !-lex). 
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To any distributional transformation x -+ y with !lex) ~ !l(y), let us 
associate another distributional transformation x -+ u where u is the income 
distribution defined by u = (!l(x)/ !l(y»y. Therefore, !l(u) = !lex) and I(u) = I(y). 
Notice also that the set of permutations between x and y is equivalent to the set 
of permutations between x and u: if for a pair of individuals i and j we have that 
xi> xi, then yi < yi if and only if ui = (!l(x)/ !l(y» yi < ui = (!l(x)/ !l(y» yi. 
Given a distributional transformation x -+ y, we can view the income 
distribution u as arising from x through income transfers among the individuals, 
which lead to income inequality l(u) = I(y) and the same set of permutations 
between x and y. Let va = X + u be the aggregate income distribution in 
distributional transformation x -+ u, and let vb = 2x, so that !l(vb) = !l(va) = 2!l(x) 
and l(vb) = lex). The income mobility associated with the distributional 
transformation x -+ u, which we call the income transfer mobility index M(x, u), is 
equal to: 
M(x, u) = {W(va) - W(vb)}/W(vb) = {lex) - l(va)}/ (l- lex)}. 
If there is any permutation between x and u, then let u' be the income 
distribution u ordered as x, and let Vc = X + u'. Then we have: 
where 
M(x, u) = SM(x, u) + EM(x, u), 
SM(x, u) = {lex) - l(vc)}/ {I - l(x)}, 
EM(x, u) = {l(vc) - l(va)}/ {I - I(x)}. 
Of course, in view of Remark 1, SM(x, u) ~ 0 ~ lex) ~ I(u) = l(y); while, in view of 
Theorem I, EM(x, u) > O. 
The differences In Income mobility between distributional 
transformations x -+ y and x -+ u are solely due to differences between !l(u) = 
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Jt(x) and Jt(y). If we define the income growth mobility index (13)GRM(x, y, u) = M(x, 
y) - M(x, u), then we can write: 
M(x, y) = SM(x, u) + EM(x, u) + GRM(x, y, u). (8) 
Expression (8) indicates that our income mobility index M(x, y) can be 
decomposed into three terms: SM(x, u), which captures the structural mobility 
due to differences in cross-section income inequality once permutations between 
x and u (or x and y) have been removed, holding mean income constant; EM(x, 
U), which captures the exchange mobility due to the permutations between x and 
u (or x and y), holding mean income constant; and GRM(x, y, u), which captures 
the income mobility due to the income growth from Jt(u) = Jt(x) and Jt(y) in the 
distributional transformation x -+ y(14). 
What relationships can be established between the concepts involved in 
the two decompositions presented in this paper? In so far as our income mobility 
index captures mobility as movement, in a descriptive context one may expect 
that M(x, y) ~ M(x, u), or what is the same, GRM(x, y, u) ~ 0, depending on 
whether Jt(y) 5. Jt(x). As we can see in the following result, in our normative 
context this is only the case under certain circumstances. 
Theorem 3. Let x -+ y be a distributional transformation with Jt(y) 
;C Jt(x). Consider the following three cases. 
(1) There are no permutations between x and y . 
(a) If I(y) s I(x), then M(x, y) ~ M(x, u) $> GRM(x, y, u) ~ 0 $> Jt(y) ~ Jt(x). 
(b) If I(y) > I(x), then M(x, y) ~ M(x, u) $> GRM(x, y, u) ~ 0 $> Jt(y) t Jt(x). 
(2) There are some permutations between x and y, but no rerankings between 
x and va = X + u. Consider the following two sub-cases. 
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(a) Assume that M(x, y) attains its upper bound, i.e., assume that I(va) = 0 
so that M(x, y) = I (x)} / (1 - I(x)}. Then M(x, y) < M(x, u) ~ GRM(x, y, u) < 0 
regardless of the relationship between ~(y) and ~(x). 
(b) Assume that M(x, y) < I(x)}/ (1- I(x)}. In this case: 
(i) M(x, y) < M(x, u) ~ GRM(x, y, u) < 0 ~ ~(y) < ~(x); 
(ii) We can have 0 < M(x, y) < M(x, u) and GRM(x, y, u) < 0, in spite 
of the fact that ~(y) > ~(x). 
(3) There are some rerankings between x and va. Independently of the sign of 
M(x, u), we can have M(x, y) < M(x, u) with ~(y) > ~(x), and M(x, y) > M(x, u) 
with ~(y) < ~(x). 
(See the proof in the Appendix). 
The relationship between M(x, y) and M(x, u) as a function as ~(y) and 
~(x) that could have been expected in a descriptive context, only obtains in 
cases 1.a, 2.a with ~(y) < ~(x), and 2.b.i. In case 1.b, the problem arises when we 
have M(x, y) < 0, a situation absent in a purely descriptive context where 
income mobility is always non-negative. As can be seen in the proof, in cases 2.a 
with ~t(y) > ~(x), 2.b.ii and 3 the problem arises when we have rerankings 
between x and za' with or without rerankings between x and va. 
v. COMPARISON WITH THE LITERATURE 
In this Section, we will compare our two decompositions with the 
discussion of the issues in the previous literature. 
We should begin with the ideas advanced in the following classical 
quotation from Markandya (1982), pp. 307-8: "within the sociological literature a 
distinction is made between changes in mobility that can be attributed to the 
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increased availability of positions in higher social classes and those changes that 
can be attributed to an increased intergenerational movement among social 
classes, for a given distribution of positions among these classes" (Emphasis in the 
original). Based on this quotation, FO review the difficulties involved in an 
operational interpretation of these concepts. In particular, to illustrate the 






x = (1, 2, 3) - Y = (3, 2, 1); za = (4,4,4) 
x = (1, 2, 3) - Y = (2, 1, 3); za = (3, 3, 6) 
x = (1, 2, 3) - Y = (1, 2, 6); za = (2,4,9) 
x = (1,2,3) - Y = (2, 3, 6); za = (3, 5, 9). 
FO state that the structure of the economy in EVI and EVIl did not 
change because the cross-sectional distributions have the same income inequality 
and the same mean. Therefore, they claim that process VI depicts more income 
mobility solely because of the differences in exchange mobility. On the other 
hand, with respect to distributional transformations VIII and IX, FO state that 
/lsince the income ranks of the individuals are preserved, and since nobody's 
income is decreased, it may be reasonable to say that there is no exchange 
mobility in these processes". Moreover, /lto the extent that IX is more mobile than 
VIII, the difference is due entirely to differences in structural mobility." 
The main difference between this -admittedly partial and suggestive-
analysis and ours is that, according to FO, for an income distribution y to have 
the same structure as x, we must have both I(y) = I(x) and ~(y) = ~ (x), as in 
examples EVI and EVIl. Correspondingly, structural mobility comes from 
differences between I(y) and I(x), as well as between ~(y) and ~(x) -as in their 
examples EVIII and EIX. In our case, two income distributions have the same 
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structure only if I(y) = I(x), whatever the relationship between /-l(y) and /-lex). The 
implications of this fundamental difference are as follows. 
As far as exchange mobility is concerned, we agree with FO that in EVI 
and EVIII all income mobility is exchange mobility. However, in our view FO 
restrict their analysis to a limited set of permutations between y and x. In 
particular, they ignore cases in which /-l(y) can diverge from /-lex), as in the 
following examples: 
E6: x = (I, 2, 3) - Y = (6,4, 2); za = (7,6, 5) 
E7: x = (I, 2, 3) - Y = (2,2/3,4/3»; za = (3,8/3, 13/3). 
Distribution x has been chosen as in EVI and EVIII, while I(y) = I(x) so that all 
income mobility is again exchange mobility in our sense. The differences are that 
in E6, /-l(Y) = 6 > /-lex) = 2, while in E7, /-l(y) = 4/3 < /-lex) = 2. Since in EVI, I(za) = 
1(4, 4, 4) = 0, income mobility reaches its upper bound, I(x)/ {I - I(x)}. The 
ordering of EVIl, E6 and E7 would depend on the relationship between 1(3, 3, 6), 
1(7, 6, 5) and 1(3, 8/3, 13/3) for an appropriate income inequality index. 
As far as structural mobility, the following two examples help to 
understand the differences between the two approaches: 
E8: x = (1, 2, 3) - Y = (8/11, 12/11,24/11) 
E9: x = (I, 2, 3) - Y = (loS, 2, 2.5). 
Since in EVIII, EIX, E8 and E9 there are no permutations, in all cases all income 
mobility is structural mobility. If we compare EVIII and E8, we find that since 
I(y) = 1(8/11, 12/11, 24/11) = 1(2, 3, 6), income mobility due to structural change 
in our sense is the same in both examples. Thus, in spite of the fact that in E8 
everybody's income is decreased and /-l(Y) = 4/3 < /-lex) = 2, we have that M(E8) = 
M(EVIII). In E9, /-l(Y) = /-lex) = 2 and income mobility can be attributed to the 
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increased income of the poorest individual, rather than in the higher social 
classes as in Markandya's quotation and FO examples VIII and IX. 
In the second place, it should be noticed that FO present no examples of a 
distributional transformation which exhibits both structural and exchange 
mobility in their sense. Consider, for example, the transformation 
El0: x = (1,2,3) -+ Y = (9, 0,3); za = (10, 2, 6). 
In order to explore the impact on income mobility of the class of permutations 
between x and y to which they restrict their analysis, the difficulty, of course, is 
how to build from y an income distribution with the same income inequality and 
the same mean income as x. In our case, what we do is construct an income 
distribution y' with the same inequality as y and in which all permutations 
between x and y have been removed, i.e. we choose y' to be the income 
distribution y ordered as x. Then we define structural mobility as the income 
mobility associated to the distributional transformation x -+ y', that is, SM(x, y) = 
M(x, y') = {I(x) - I(zc)} / {1 - I(x)}; in EI0, ZC = x + y' = (1, 5, 12). Our measure of 
exchange mobility is the difference between M(x, y) and M(x, y'), i.e. EM(x, y) = 
{I(zc) - I(za)} / {1 - I(x)}. 
If one wants to isolate the effect of the changes in the mean in a 
distributional transformation x -+ y, our proposal is to use our second 
decomposition in which income mobility is seen to arise from three sources: 
changes in cross-section income inequality and permutations between x and y, 
holding the mean income constant at the level of ~(x); and changes in mean 
incomes which get captured by the term GRM(x, y, u). 
In the third place, FO's analysis refers to a descriptive view of income 
mobility that is silent on the conditions under which structural, exchange or total 
mobility is socially desirable. In particular, it appears that the distinction between 
20 
what we call permutations and rerankings has no role in a descriptive view of 
income mobility(15). Consequently, from this position it is impossible to 
appreciate the potential deleterious effect on social welfare of J/too much" 
rerankings (see E4 and Theorem 2). Finally, as we have seen in the previous 
Section, whether one adopts a descriptive or a normative approach influences 
our views on how income mobility varies with changes in ~(y). 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Until recently, we could only evaluate an economy's performance over 
time with individual income data drawn from two (or more) independent 
population samples in different time periods. It is quite obvious that the usual 
comparison in inequality or social welfare terms of two snapshot income 
distributions permits only a partial evaluation of the dynamic economic process. 
A convincing criticism is conveniently summarized in the following quotation 
from Karcher et al. (1995): J/ .. . since the individuals' positions on the cardinal 
income scale rarely remain unchanged over time, an increase in a snapshot 
measure of inequality is clearly consistent with there having been a significant 
amount of equalizing mobility over time. Only if all individuals' earnings remain 
constant from period to period will a measure of inequality or welfare give the 
same result irrespective of the length of the accounting period". 
CDW's modeling of the dynamic evaluation problem can be viewed as an 
attempt to confront this criticism. Conceptually, they suggest that an income 
mobility index can be obtained by comparing the social welfare of the actual 
distributional transformation with the social welfare of a hypothetical 
distributional transformation which exhibits no mobility. Operationally, they 
assume that the social welfare of any distributional transformation can be 
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identified with the social welfare of the aggregate income distribution. In 
particular, under the type of SEF they adopt, what matters at the social level is 
the inequality of the aggregate income distribution -a fundamental idea which 
the previous quotation points out too. 
There are several observable factors in longitudinal data sets which affect 
the inequality of the aggregate income distribution. What we have done in this 
paper is to develop the idea that, within CDW's framework, it is useful to start by 
concentrating on changes in cross-section or snapshot income inequality, and 
changes in income shares (or absolute income differences). Within the limits of a 
two-period model, we have shown how to decompose CDW's income mobility 
index into two indexes of structural and exchange mobility which capture, 
respectively, the welfare effect of these two types of income changes. In so doing, 
we have shown the relevance of distinguishing between two kinds of rank 
reversals: permutations between the first- and second-period income 
distributions, and rerankings between the initial and the aggregate or final 
situation. 
This decomposition should help in the interpretation of observable data. 
Take, for instance, the well known fact that in many OCDE countries -notably, 
the U.K and the U.S.- income inequality increased considerably during the 
1980s(16). Some may fear that the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting 
poorer, which should cause a decrease in social welfare; while some may share 
Friedman (1962),s belief that " ... capitalism undermines status and induces social 
mobility,,(17) offseting the increase in snapshot income inequality. In the language 
of the theory, we can be certain that structural mobility in those countries during 
this period is negative. The first group of people fears that during this period 
exchange mobility might be small, causing total income mobility to be negative; 
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while Friedman's position can be interpreted as the belief that, whenever 
necessary, under capitalism exchange mobility would come to the rescue to 
ensure that the change in social welfare resulting from income changes over time 
would always be positive. 
If, in addition, one wants to isolate the effect on mobility of mean 
incomes changes, we then propose a second decomposition in which income 
mobility is seen to arise from three sources: changes in cross-section income 
inequality and permutations, holding the mean income of the second-period 
income distribution constant at the level of the first-period one; and changes in 
mean incomes which appear as a residual in an income growth mobility term. 
From a conceptual point of view, we should emphasize that our results on 
the properties of the different income mobility concepts introduced along the 
paper, have been obtained in a framework which, contrary to the seminal 
contributions by King (1983) and Markandya (1982, 1984), does not involve any 
new value judgments beyond the traditional ones. In particular, we do not 
assume that either permutations or rerankings have any positive value. 
We believe that in situations where there typically are individual rank 
reversals, our approach is immediately applicable. Consider, for instance, the 
following three problems characterized by two stages in a static context. In the 
first place, CDW point out that, in their study of tax and benefit progressivity, 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) compare the actual after-tax income distribution 
with the distribution which would have resulted if taxes had been raised 
proportionally. Reinterpreting za as after-tax income, and zb as the hypothetical 
distribution arising from proportional taxation, CDW's income mobility index 
becomes Blackorby and Donaldson's index of relative tax progressivity(18). Think 
also of the possibility of interpreting za as household income, and zb as the 
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distribution that results from either only considering household head incomes 
versus the incomes earned by other household members, or only considering all 
market incomes as opposed to public transfers. 
Whether the decompositions developed in this paper might work in other 
income mobility models is an open question left for future research. In any case, 
we should mention that the greatest limitation of our approach is surely the 
restriction to a two period world. The extension to a truly multiperiod context 
must start with a model of how to evaluate, from an ethical point of view, 
multi period individual income streams. On the other hand, if the present two 
period model were to be naively extended to three or more periods, we know 
that the results would depend on the decision about the reference period. 
Therefore, what is also needed is an appropriate suggestion for the notion of an 
immobile distributional transformation in a multi period context. 
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APPENDIX 
Theorem 1. Let x ~ Y be a distributional transformation where there is some 
permutation between x and y. Then EM(x, y) > o. 
Proof: 
Recall that x = (x\ ... , xn) is ordered so that x\s; i ... s xn, and let y' be the 
vector y ordered as x. That there is some permutation between x and y, means 
that y;o! y'. Let 1 si be the first individual for whom yi > yi'. There must be some 
individual j > i for whom yi = yi'. Thus, xi < xi and / > yi. 
Let us interchange the ranks of individuals i and j in vector y, i.e. let us 
define Yl such that y1i = yi, y1i = /, and Yl k = yk for all k;o! i, j. Define zal = x + 
Yl. Since ~(Yl) = ~(y), ~(zal) = ~(za). Note that Zli = xi + yi, zli = xi + yi, and z/ = 
k . . .. .... 




There are two cases. Given that xi < xi, if there is a reranking involving 
individuals i and j, i. e. if zai > zai, then by (1) we have: 
Otherwise, i. e. if zai s zai, then by (2) we have: 
In both cases, the aggregate income distribution za can be obtained from zal via a 
progressive transfer. Therefore, I(za) < I(zal) for all well behaved relative or 
absolute inequality indexes I. 
Recall that EM(x, y) = {I(zc) - I(za)} / {1 - I(x)}, where Zc = x + y'. If Yl = y', 
so that zal = zc' then we are done. Otherwise, there must be some individual r > i 
for whom y/ > l'. In that case, there must be some individual s > r for whom y1s 
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= l'. Thus, xr < xS and Ytr > Yts. Let us interchange the ranks of individuals r 
and s in vector Yt, i.e. let us define Y2 such that Y2f = YtS, Y2s = Ytf , and Y/ = Y/ 
for all k ;I! r, s. Define za2 = x + Y 2' By an argument analogous to the previous one, 
we conclude that I(zal) < l(za2)' If Y2 = y', so that za2 = zC' then we are done. 
Otherwise, we proceed in the same manner until we show that I(za) < I(zc)' i. e. 
EM(x, y) > O. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2. Let x ~ Y be a distributional transformation where there is some 
reranking between x and za' Then, there exists some y*ED with the following 
properties: i) It(Y*) = It(Y); ii) M(x, y*) = M(x, y); iii) There is no reranking between 
x and za * = X + y*; iv) l(y*) < I(Y2)' 
Proof: 
Let za' be the vector za ordered as x. Define y* = za' - x. If zai, = zai, then yi* = 
za
i 
- xi = yi> o. If zai, ;I! zai, say zai, < zai, then there must be some other individual 
j> i such that zai, = zaj = xj + yj. Since xi s xj, yi* = xj + yj - xi > O. Thus, y*ED, so 
that x ~ Y is a distributional transformation with za * = X + y* = za'. 
Since It(za *) = It(za') = It (za)' we have that ItCy*) = It(y), which is condition 
(i). Since l(za *) = l(za') = l(za)' we have 
M(x, y*) = {lex) - l(za *)} / {1 - l(x)} = {I(x) -I(za)} / {1 - I(x)} = M(x, y), 
which is condition (ii). Since za * = za' and za' is ordered as x, there is no 
reranking between x and za *, which is condition (iii). 
That there is some reranking between x and za means that za *;I! za'. Let 1 si 
be the first individual for whom zai > z/. There must be some individual j > i for 
whom zaj = z/. Let us interchange the ranks of individuals i and j in vector za' 
. 1 t d f' h h i j j i d k k f 11 k " I.e. e us elneVtSUc t atvt =za,Vt =za,an Vt =za ora ;l!l,J. 
Cl 1 () () D f' Th i j i j i j k ear y, It Vt = It za' e me Yl = Vt - x. us, Yl = za - X 'Yl = za - X , Yl = 
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Note that Zai > zai if and only if xi + yi > xi + yi, or yi_ yi > xi - xi. On the other 
h d i i i i'f d l'f i i i i i j i i an ,vl = za > vl = Za 1 an on y 1 X + Yl >x + Yl' or Yl - Yl <x - x. 
Therefore, Yli- Yli < /- yi. Taking into account that Ylk =yk for all k ~ i, j, and 
!-l(Yl) = !-l(Y), this implies that Y 1 can be obtained from Y via a progressive transfer. 
Therefore, I(Yl) < I(y) for all well behaved relative or absolute inequality indexes 
1. 
If vl = za', then we are done because Yl = y*. Otherwise, there must exist 
some individual r > i for which v1
r 
> z/' as well as some other s > r for whom 
v1
s 
= z/. Let us interchange the ranks of individuals rand s in vector v1' i.e. let 
us define v2 such that V2i = vl s, Vls = v/' and v/ = v/ for all k ~ i, j. Define Y2 = 
V2 - x. By an argument analogous to the previous one, we conclude that I(Y2) < 
I(Yl)' If v2 = za', so that Y2 = y*, then we are done. Otherwise, we proceed in the 
same manner until we show that I(y*) < I(y), which is point iv) in the Theorem. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3. Let x ~ y be a distributional transformation with !-l (y) ~ !-lex). Recall 
that 
SM(x, y) = {I(x) - I(zc)} / {1 - I(x)} 
SM(x, u) = {lex) - I(vc)}/ {l- I(x)}, 
where Zc = x + y', Vc = X + y', and y' and u' are the income distributions y and u 
ordered as x. It is easy to see that 
SM(x, y) ~ SM(x, u) <=> !-l(y) ~ !-lex). (5) 
As in case (1) of the theorem, assume that there are no permutations between x 
and y. In this case, M(x, y) = SM(x, y) and M(x, u) = SM(x, u). If I(y') = I(u') s I(x), 
as in case 1.a, then in view of (5): 
M(x, y) Z M(x, u) > 0 <=> GRM(x, y, u) z 0 <=> !-l(y) ~ !-lex). 
If, as in case 1.b, I(y') = I(u') > I(x), then in view of (5): 
M(x, y) s M(x, u) < 0 <=> GRM(x, y, u) sO<=> !-l(y) ~ !-lex). 
> >, 
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As in case (2), assume that there are some permutations between x and y, but 
no rerankings between x and va = X + u. Assume also, as in case 2.a, that M(x, y) 
attains its upper bound, i.e. I(va) = 0 and M(x, y) = I(x)}/ {1 - I(x)}. Then, by the 
definition of an upper bound, M(x, y) < M(x, u) ~ GRM(x, y, u) < 0 regardless of 
the relationship between ~(y) and ~(x). 
As in case 2.b, assume that M(x, y) < I(x)} / {1 - I(x)}. Notice that if ~(y) :S ~(x), 
as in case 2.b.i, then there is no re ranking between x and za = x + y. Otherwise, 
i.e., if there is a pair of individuals i, j such that xi> xi, yi < yi, and xi + yi > xi + yi, 
then xi + (~(x)/ ~(y» yi> xi + (~(x)/ ~(y» yi, i. e. xi + ui > xi + ui, a contradiction 
with the assumption that there are no rerankings between x and va. Consider the 
case in which I(y) = I(u) < I(x). Since za = x + y and va = X + u, I(za) > I(va) for all y 
with ~(y) < ~(x). Therefore, in this case: 0 < M(x, y) < M(x, u) ~ GRM(x, y, u) < 0 
~ ~(y) < ~(x). 
If ~(y) > ~(x), as in case 2.b.ii, then SM(x, y) > SM(x, u) as we saw in case 1.a. 
However, in this case there can be rerankings between x and za' which may cause 
EM(x, y) to be sufficiently smaller than EM(x, u) and M(x, y) < M(x, u). This is 
illustrated in the following example, in which there is a permutation between x 
and y, no re ranking between x and va' but a re ranking between x and za: 
x = (1, 5) - Y = (40, 20), za = (41, 25); 
x = (1, 5) - u = (4, 2), va = (5, 7). 
It is clear that I(x) = 1(1, 5) > I(za) = 1(41, 25) > I(va) = 1(5, 7), so that 0 < M(x, y) 
< M(x, u). Therefore, GRM(x, y, u) < 0, in spite of the fact that ~(y) = 30 > ~(x) = 3. 
Assume, as in case 3, that there are some rerankings between x and va. 
Consider the following two examples, in which M(x, u) = o. 
x = (1, 2) - Y = (12, 0), za = (13, 2); 
x = (1, 2) - y# = (2.5, 0), za# = (3.5, 2); 
x = (I, 2) - u = (3, 0), va = (4, 2). 
In the first example, I(x) = 1(1, 2) < I(za) = 1(13, 2) and I(x) = 1(1, 2) = I(va) = 1(4, 
2). Therefore, M(x, y) < M(x, u) = 0, in spite of the fact that ~(y) = 6 > ~(x) = 1.5. 
In the second example, I(x) = 1(1, 2) < I(za #) = 1(3.5, 2). Therefore, M(x, y) > M(x, 
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u) = 0 in spite of the fact that !-l(Y) = 1.25 < !-lex) = 1.5. Finally, consider the 
following two examples, in which M(x, u) < 0: 
x = (3, 4) - Y = (24, 4), za = (27, 8); 
x = (3,4) - y# = (1,1/6), za# = (4, 25/6); 
x = (3,4) - u = (6, 1), va = (9,5). 
In both examples, I(x) = 1(3, 4) < I(va) = 1(9, 5), so that M(x, u) < O. In the first 
example, I(za) = 1(27, 8) > I(va) = 1(9, 5), so that M(x, y) < M(x, u) = 0 in spite of 
the fact that !-l(Y) = 17.5> !-lex) = 3.5. In the second example, I(x) = 1(3,4) > I(za#) 





(1) As FO conclude, 11 All in all, the present literature on income mobility falls 
short of providing an exact, robust decomposition of total mobility into its basic 
sources" (p. 565). For another valuable discussion of the difficulties involved in 
modeling structural and exchange mobility, see Shorrocks (1993). 
(2) For the strengths and limitations of this approach, as well as references, see 
Sections 2.5, 4.3 and 5 in Fields and Ok (2000). 
(3) For descriptive measures in this framework, see inter alia the relative indices 
suggested by Shorrocks (1978b) and Cowell (1985), and the absolute indices 
proposed by Berrebi and Silber (1983) and Fields and Ok (1996). 
(4) For other aggregation schemes, see, for instance, Shorrocks (1978a), 
Maasoumi and Zandvakili (1989, 1990) -based on Maasoumi (1986)- as well as the 
criticism of them by Dardadoni (1990). For another approach to the construction 
of lifetime income, see Cowell (1979). 
(5) In the individualistic tradition of welfare economics, we want the welfare of 
every individual to count in the definition of social welfare. In the normative 
approach to income mobility where the SEF is defined on the set of transition 
matrices, some of this information is lost. From this point of view, it is an 
advantage to work with distributional transformations where all individual 
incomes are explicitly considered. 
(6) In the absolute case, the benchmark distributional transformation x - Yh 
would be chosen to be absolutely immobile, i.e. income differences would be 
preserved through time. 
(7) In the absolute case, we would have MA(x, y) = W(za) - W(zh). 
(8) Shorrocks (1978a) justifies A.3 as a direct application in the intertemporal 
context of the population replication axiom, usually assumed in income 
distribution theory in order to compare the income inequality of populations of 
different size. 
(9) For example, CDW assume that W is homothetic. In this case, it is well 
known that we can write W(x) = ~(x){l - IAKS(x)}, where IAKS is the relative 
inequality index obtained according to the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen procedure 
which uses the notion of an equally distributed income. Alternatively, because 
of its good additive separability properties in Ruiz-Castillo (2000) we use W(x) 
= ~(x){l - le(x)}, where le for c = 1, 2, stand for the following members of the 
general entropy family of income inequality indices: the first inequality index 
originally suggested by Theil, and an ordinal transformation of the coefficient 
of variation, respectively. 
(10) In the absolute case, the SEF can be expressed in terms of the mean and a 
translatable index of absolute inequality lA. In particular, we may assume that 
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W(x) = ~(x) - lA (X), in which case the absolute income mobility index defined in 
note (7) becomes MA(x, y) = IA(x) - IA(za)' Because of its good normative and 
additive separability properties, the best choice in this case is the Kolm-Pollak 
SEF -see Blackorby and Donaldson (1980). 
(11) It is easy to see that, given a distributional transformation x -- y, M(A-x, ay) 
;.e M(x, y) for different A- and a > 0, i. e. in FO's terminology our mobility index is 
not strongly relative or intertemporally scale invariant. On the other hand, in the 
absolute case the income mobility index defined in note (10) is weakly absolute, i. 
e. MA(x + b, y + b) = MA(x, y) for all vectors b= (b, ... , b) whose elements are all 
equal. 
(12) In this sense, our approach follows definition 11 in Markandya (1984). On 
the other hand, in the absolute case we will simply have MA (x, y) = SMA (x, y) + 
EMA(x, y), where SMA(x, y) = IA(x) - IA(zc)' and EMA(x, y) = IA(zc) - IA(za)' 
(13) The terminology to differentiate between "income transfer" and "income 
growth" mobility, has been adapted from Fields and Ok (1996), where an 
analogous distinction between total movement due to the transfer of income and 
total movement due to economic growth (or to economic contraction) is drawn for the 
purpose of decomposing a descriptive and absolute income mobility index into 
two terms. 
(14) In the absolute case, we simply have MA(x, y) = SMA(x, u) + EMA(x, u) + 
GRM(x, y, u), where SMA(x, u) = IA(x) - IA(vc)' EMA(x, u) = IA(vc) - IA(va), 
GRM(x, y, u) = MA(x, y) - MA(x, u), and MA(x, u) = IA(x) - IA(va). 
(15) As a matter of fact, in FO's examples EVI and EVIl there are permutations 
between x and y but no rerankings between x and za' 
(16) See, for instance, Atkinson et al. (1995). 
(17) The full quotation is as follows: "Consider two societies that have the same 
distribution of annual income. In one there is great mobility and change so that 
the position of particular families in the income hierarchy varies from year to 
year. In the other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in the same 
position year after year. The one kind of inequality is a sign of dynamic change, 
social mobility, equality of opportunity; the other, of a status society. The 
confusion of these two kinds of inequality is particularly important precisely 
because competitive free-enterprise capitalism tends to substitute the one for 
the other ... capitalism undermines status and induces social mobility". 
(18) For an analysis of the structural and exchange income mobility induced by 
the income tax, as well as the measurement of horizontal inequality, see Section 
III in Ruiz-Castillo (1997). 
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